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Abstract
In Hungary, some judges tend to decide cases in a way they think is popular among ordinary 
people. I call this phenomenon “judicial populism”. First, by analysing three cases I argue 
that the plausible theoretical framework of explanation of populist tendencies in Hungarian 
adjudication is the American Legal Realism. Then I examine the characteristics and possible 
explanation of judicial populism and its relation with the political populism.
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Resumen
En Hungría, algunos jueces tienden a decidir los casos de una manera que consideran es popular 
entre la gente común. Yo llamo a este fenómeno “populismo judicial”. En primer lugar, a través de 
analizar tres casos, sostengo que el marco teórico plausible para explicar las tendencias populistas 
en la jurisdicción húngara es el Realismo Legal estadounidense. En segundo término, examino las 
características y la posible explicación del populismo judicial y su relación con el populismo político.
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1. Introduction
In Hungary, some judges tend to decide cases in a way they think is popular among ordinary 
people. I call this phenomenon “judicial populism”.3 I argue in this paper that judicial populism 
cannot be explained correctly —and cannot even be detected— by interpreting and evaluating 
judgments with utmost good faith.
1 This publication is part of the DEMOS project and has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822590. Any dissemination of results here presented reflects 
only the authors’ view. The Agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. I am 
grateful to my reviewers for their valuable comments. 
2 Mátyás Bencze, professor of law, University of Debrecen, research fellow, Centre for Social Science, Institute for Legal 
Studies. E-mail: bencze.matyas@tk.mta.hu ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3234-0440
3 Another group within the judiciary remains more loyal to the law, and sticks to the principles of established judicial 
practice, even if that makes them unpopular to the point where they have to face heavy criticism or even threats from 
politicians and journalists. But this is another story I will analyse in a different paper.
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While the version of American Legal Realism, which is commonly characterized as “rule-
scepticism” (Frank, 1949), has been under permanent attack (Hart, 2012) and sometimes 
treated with sarcasm (Kozinski, 1993) its explanatory force has proved surprisingly strong 
in certain fields of adjudication (Danziger et al., 2011). The most important observation 
of Legal Realists is that the law (whatever we mean by this term) is flexible enough to 
support —on repeated occasions— legal decisions which even oppose each other (Frank, 
1963). By using a wide scale of legal arguments judges can hide the extra-legal factors 
which influence their decision in reality. That is why maintaining the coherence of law (and 
judicial decisions) is not as compelling a requirement for judges as doctrinal legal scholars 
and many legal theorists consider it to be. That is why the always distrustful Legal Realism 
may be the most appropriate theoretical framework for investigating a new development 
in Hungarian judicial practice.
First, I describe three recent cases which are examples of this development; then, 
I present the possible explanations of the judicial decisions and argue that the legal realist 
approach is useful for revealing some extra-legal factors behind Hungarian judicial practice. 
Finally, I outline the sociological characteristics of judicial populism.
2. Three judicial decisions 
In the last few years the number of controversial judicial decisions from all branches of 
adjudication has been increasing, and they share some common distinctive features. I will 
summarize three of them (all the three are criminal cases as I have expertise only in this field of 
law); then I will highlight the common features of these judgments and try to seek a plausible 
explanation for them.
2.1. A millionaire shall be held in detention 
In 2013 a striking decision was issued. A Slovakian woman, mother of two children, killed four 
people in a car accident when driving recklessly on a Hungarian motorway. It is important to 
know that the perpetrator is a millionaire who has been often seen on the front pages of Slovakian 
tabloids. The Hungarian court of first instance sent her to prison for six years, at the same time, 
however, releasing her from detention and ordering her house arrest until the final decision of 
the appellate court was delivered. The decision on house arrest provoked a huge public outcry 
in a large section of the public that believes rich people always get special treatment. They were 
convinced that the court had made an exemption when, instead of keeping the millionaire in 
jail, let her return to her own home so that she could go on living her luxurious life.4 Nine days 
later the appellate court changed the decision on the house arrest and re-ordered the post-charge 
detention, explaining its decision with the “flight risk” of the defendant. The appellate court 
presented no evidence as regards a planned flight attempt. It simply stated that she was rich 
enough to organize her own escape, even from a house arrest (Budapest Környéki Törvényszék, 
2013). In 2014 the appeal court increased her prison sentence to 9 years. One of the reasons for 
the aggravation was that the accident caused huge public outcry.5
2.2. Red mud disaster 
In 2010 an industrial accident at a caustic waste reservoir chain occurred at an alumina factory 
in the western part of Hungary.6 As a consequence of the disaster toxic “red mud” killed 10 
4 For the media reaction see Hungarian Specturm (2013).
5 See, Janecskó (2014) and Daily News Hungary (2014). 
6 See, Wikipedia (2010).
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people. In 2016 a judge cleared all the 15 defendants who were employees at the alumina 
company (from the CEO of the company to the warden of the reservoir). The decision was 
considered outrageous by many people.7 The appeal court quashed the ruling in February 2017 
and ordered a retrial. The reason was that the court of first instance did not provide sufficient 
reasoning for the judgement. In the repeated procedure ordered by the appellate court the trial 
court found guilty 10 defendants of the 15.8
2.3. A fast and furious camerawoman9 
In October 2018, the Curia (Supreme Court of Hungary) acquitted a journalist (a camerawoman) 
from charges of violent attack against refugees on the Hungarian-Serbian border in 2015. The 
Curia, by reversing the judgments of lower courts, found that the journalist did not commit the 
crime of public nuisance when, without any lawful reason, she tripped and kicked refugees fleeing 
the police on the border, since the act of the journalist was not blatantly antisocial with regard to 
the public peace, which had been already disturbed by the fleeing migrants themselves.10
It must be added that the three cases summarized above are just a few examples from 
a pool of similar cases. We can find an ever-increasing number of judgments with the same 
characteristics (Bencze, 2014).
3. Legal evaluation of the decisions
As it is obvious, in the first case the mere facts of being rich and a foreign citizen cannot be the 
basis for detention without other circumstances that present the risk of escaping sufficiently 
serious. As for the final judgment, the harshness of the sentence is far above the average length of 
prison sentences in similar cases. In the table below I have collected the decisions that represent 
the judicial practice.
Case identifier number of people 
killed in the aCCident other CirCumstanCes sentenCe
FBK 1993/21. No data No data 6 years
BH 1978.3.107 4




5 other people injured
Has a criminal record
7 years
EH 2003.932 No data No data 7.5 years
Kiskunfélegyháza 4 Has a criminal record 8 years
Rezesova 4




7 See, Mandiner (2016).
8 See, Budapest Business Journal (2019). 
9 This case is from a manuscript written by the author and Ágnes Kovács titled “Judicial independence and models of court 
administration”.
10 Currently, only the press release is available is: Kúria (2018). 
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In the second case the appeal court used a “jolly joker” argument, namely the argument of 
“insufficient reasoning”. According to the Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act the lack of 
sufficient reasoning qualifies as a serious violation of the fair trial principle and thus can be the 
basis for quashing a judgement. Nonetheless, the law does not specify the required minimal 
extent of sufficiency, so courts of appeal can interpret this provision of the code very flexibly 
if they do not agree with the verdict of the trial court, and they do not have any other legal 
opportunity to overturn it.11 It is also worth mentioning that one retired senior judge wrote a 
book on this case and she characterized the trial judge as one of the most competent judges she 
had ever seen.12 
In the third case, the Curia delivered a decision and argumentation that greatly 
deviated from the coherent judicial practice, which existed in public nuisance cases. It held 
that the flight of the refugees had already caused disturbance, and thus the behaviour of the 
camerawoman could have not caused it (causing turmoil is one of the legal criteria of guilt in 
public nuisance cases).13 This reasoning implies the absurd conclusion that everybody can kick 
another person without facing charges in a scene of turmoil.
4. Possible explanations
From a legal formalist point of view, which requires from the judge a textualist approach 
combined with the correct application of legal concepts and legal institutions, the possible 
explanation might be that the judgements presented in every case are all the result of accidental 
judicial miscarriages that occur in every legal system. However, these judicial miscarriages, just 
like cases of medical mistreatment, stemmed from negligence or ignorance, and it is hard to 
believe that in all three cases —where experienced senior judges of higher courts made the 
decisions in a judicial panel— negligence or ignorance were the main reasons such controversial 
judgments were delivered. On the other hand, as we will see later, if we were simply dealing 
with judicial miscarriages, we would not be able to find a suspicious common tendency in all 
the judgments examined. 
Another possible perspective is the Dworkinian approach (Dworkin, 1996).  It may 
be that the judges in those three cases have a strong conservative-communitarian political 
view. At first glance, this might explain the decisions, as in all three cases judges thought that 
the interests of the Hungarian political community had to prevail over other legal principles 
such as proportionality, the right to a fair trial and equality. It is easy, however, to realize that 
xenophobia (in the first and the third cases) is not a moral principle, even if the majority of 
Hungarian citizens share this attitude.  As for the second case (the red mud disaster) solidarity 
with victims may be the sign of communitarian attitude, but prejudice towards a company 
which represents “Big Money” is also a plausible explanation. 
Besides this we must bear in mind that cases were decided in such a way that pleases 
the man or woman in the street. This mentality is not an attribute of conservative political 
thinking at all. Furthermore, we conducted an on-line survey amongst Hungarian judges in 
order to determine their judicial attitudes and our findings showed that there is no conservative 
majority within the judiciary (Bencze, 2013). To sum up the analysed decisions cannot be 
sufficiently explained either from a formalist or from a Dworkinian point of view. Following 
from that, another explanation should be elaborated. The starting point is that there are some 
common features in all the three cases.
11 See, Kúria Büntető Kollégium (2012).
12 See the video of the scholarly discussion on the first instance judgement in: Youtube (2017). 
13 See, EH 2019.03.B5
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The first is that judges, although used legal arguments, did not provide their judgements 
with sufficient reasoning. Whether a judge engages with rule-based decision-making or 
with the Dworkinian model, her first-order obligation is to take all relevant legal reasons 
into consideration. Then, the judge has to present a transparent, coherent and convincing 
explanation for why she emphasized one of these reasons and not others in the decision-making 
process. Judges in all three cases significantly limited the number of adequate legal reasons, that 
is, they did not take their professional obligations seriously.
Secondly, the cases received —although to varying extents— nation-wide publicity. 
Judges knew that the wider public would be informed of their decisions. Besides, pressure on 
courts exercised by politicians was clearly detectable in all the three cases. In the Rezesova case, 
one prominent member of the governing party (Fidesz) shortly after the judgement of the trial 
court took along a cameraman and delivered a short message in front of Rezesova’s residence, 
which he placed on his Facebook site. He expressed his disgust and, in the name of the Fidesz 
parliamentary faction, called on the parliamentary committee dealing with legal matters and on 
the minister of justice to investigate the outrageous decision that the defendant could spend her 
time between the two trials in the comfort of her home.14 In the second case, when the ruling of 
the first instance court was issued, one of the leaders of Fidesz publicly denounced the judgment 
as outrageous and initiated a parliamentary debate about the administration of justice. He 
stressed that the ruling party respected the “liberal” standard of judicial independence but 
democratic values such as transparency and accountability should have been enforced, as well.15 
In the case of the camerawoman there was no direct pressure, but it is important to know that 
the judgment obviously fits into the hostile approach of the government towards migrants.16
Following from this, it is safe to say that the judicial decisions in the three cases were 
influenced by extra-legal factors in a hidden way. By “hidden way”, I mean that at the textual 
level of the judgments one cannot find a direct reference to extra-legal factors, they use only 
professional, legal-doctrinal language. This is why Legal Realism can be an adequate theoretical 
framework for a more detailed examination of the tendency presented here. Legal realism is a 
theory which emphasizes the impact of extra-legal factors on judicial practice and, at the same 
time, incorporates the flexibility thesis: the language of the law is flexible enough to maintain 
the appearance of the legal-professional character of the decision. Legal realism also paves the 
way for a sociological explanation of the judicial practice.
My hypothesis is that the explanation for the judgements presented comes from 
an attitudinal extra-legal factor. I call this type extra-legal factor “judicial populism”. Before 
examining the plausibility of my explanation, I must clarify what I mean by the term 
“judicial populism”. 
5. What does populism mean in a judicial context? 
The term populism in the field of legal scholarship generally refers to the behaviour of the 
legislator. Political populism is a strategy to gain more political power by pandering to public 
sentiment, and professing to protect the interests of “ordinary people” against the “elite” 
(Canovan, 1981). One of the obvious examples is what David Garland described as “penal 
populism” in the field of criminal legislation (Garland, 2001). 
It is my belief that populism plays a different role in judicial behaviour. Ordinary 
judges very rarely aspire to governmental power. That is why in the field of judicial practice 
14 Hungarian Spectrum (2013). 
15  Magyar Nemzet (2016).
16 For an overview, see http://abouthungary.hu/illegal-immigration/
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populism, at least in the form I examine it, is not a means to gain more political power. 
Judicial populism is rooted in a “drifting with the tide” mentality. Populist judges do 
not tend to confront the perceived opinion of the vast majority of people or powerful 
social groups, groups which, like many ordinary people, usually do not have too high an 
estimation of the value of traditional legal reasons in resolving sensitive legal disputes. 
This is the reason why I find the category of “populism” appropriate to conceptualize 
the phenomenon outlined here. Judicial populism, like political populism, systematically 
devalues the professional approach to solving problems in favour of making a decision that 
is popular amongst ordinary people. The pattern of the behaviour of actors is the same in 
both cases: they present their acts as being in the service of ordinary people and in doing so 
they distinguish themselves from the “elite group” (politicians, lawyers) to whom they are 
commonly considered to belong. This may result in a decline in expert authority in both 
forms of populism (Zimring, 1996).
As part of the conceptual clarification of judicial populism it may be useful to 
mention a caveat here. Judicial populism is not the same as popularizing judicial decisions 
(explaining and communicating the judgements issued in a clear and understandable language 
for ordinary citizens). As we could see, the decisions discussed above were populist in their 
result, and not in their language of argumentation.
The way I have clarified the concept of judicial populism in the last few paragraphs 
may make it quite obvious that I treat the phenomenon examined as a certain type of 
behaviour of judges. On one hand, this approach implies that populism may have an impact 
on the motivation of a judge when deciding a case. 
There might be two main reasons for a judge to follow the populist adjudicative 
method. When a judge truly believes that (s)he has to take into consideration the interests 
and opinion of ordinary people, we can refer to this as “honest populism”. On the other 
hand, populism may also serve as a kind of judicial strategy, where judges follow a purpose by 
applying this strategy that can be clearly distinguished from the purpose of satisfying public 
needs and sentiments. “Strategic populism”, for example, may serve a “shield” function that 
can help judges, under uncertain political circumstances, to secure their institutional position 
through the external support of the public sphere.
In order to examine the strategic use of populism we need to turn to public choice 
theory. In this case we have to see courts as players in the arena of governmental politics, who 
tend to enforce their institutional interests by applying various strategies. I find it possible 
that Hungarian courts use a populist strategy in some cases as a means of fulfilling their 
institutional purposes. Nonetheless, we do not have enough empirical data that could justify 
or falsify the presence of a strategic use of populist adjudication in Hungary. That is why 
I scrutinize judicial populism as a form of judicial approach to legal problems and I try 
to discover the circumstances which have facilitated the emergence of populism amongst 
Hungarian judges. 
What are the main attributes of this judicial approach? In order to answer this 
question it would be useful to compare populism with another judicial approach also driven 
by extra-legal considerations, namely with pragmatism. 
There is a similarity between the two approaches: both of them focus on the 
social impact of the decision and do not care much about its legal correctness. Nonetheless, 
pragmatist judges consider more important to adequately reflect the social needs behind 
the law. Several representatives of the pragmatist approach have a clear concept of the social 
function of law that adjudication should serve (Posner, 1996). These versions of judicial 
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decision-making can be called “reflective” pragmatism, since we may discover a more or less 
coherent ideology which drives them in a series of judgments.  
As for judicial populism, one of its essential features is that judges deciding 
certain cases feel bound to the views and sentiments of the “ordinary man or woman”. 
This serves as a solid orientation point for a populist judge in delivering a judgment. It 
would, however, be misleading if we characterised populism as a kind of reflective pragmatist 
approach. The populist approach is certainly pragmatist in a sense. For a populist judge the 
practical consequence of a decision does matter, rather than the inner coherency of law or 
the justification of moral principles. However, reflective pragmatists see judicial power as a 
means to achieve a certain social aim and they are sensitive to the long-term consequences 
of the judgement. On the contrary, a populist judge does not reflect on the deeper social 
consequences of his or her decision. What matters for a populist judge is the immediate 
reaction from the media and “ordinary people” to her decision. 
From this short comparison we can conclude that if a judge deliberately breaches the 
standards of proper legal reasoning in order to satisfy the presumed expectation of “ordinary 
people”, we may talk about judicial populism. 
6. The sociological background of judicial populism
Adjudication is a fundamentally and profoundly political activity since judicial decisions 
determine the life of citizens in the same way as legislative acts do. The difference between 
judicial and legislative decision-making can be found in their scope (any citizen or the 
involved parties) and not in their character. Courts and parliaments are equally entitled to 
impose duties on citizens on the ground that they have the authority (legitimate power) to 
do so (Dworkin, 1980). This authority is deeply rooted in the political settings of the society 
in question. Different societies therefore may have different grounds of authority (divine 
power, charisma of the leader, democratic legitimacy etc.). In the vast majority of modern 
Western societies the authority of courts, as in the case of legislation, can be derived from the 
agreement of the members of the whole political community (“people”). That is why courts 
are bound to the circumstances of politics, and their activities cannot be understood as a 
purely professional activity. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that populism, as it is in the 
case of politics, is one of the possible answers deriving from the expectations of the political 
community toward the courts.17
Beside this similarity between politics and adjudication there are two other 
tendencies that may facilitate the world-wide spread of judicial populism, namely the 
politicisation and mediatisation of adjudication (Hack, 2014). With increasing frequency 
over the past three decades sensitive political cases have been brought before courts. 
Moreover, in some cases —mostly criminal ones— court judgments have themselves 
acquired political significance. 
Since the early nineties the media has also paid increasing attention to court trials, and 
court trials have been more and more frequently broadcasted. Some interesting cases are watched 
by tens of millions of viewers on a daily basis in the form of a TV show. The presence of journalists 
and TV cameras may have an impact on the behaviour of judges. It has been already detected that 
in some countries court decision are sometimes influenced by popular sentiment.18
17 Lon Fuller has already described judicial populism as one of the argumentative strategies of judges in his famous parable 
of the Speluncean Explorers. It is Justice Handy who represents the populist view (Fuller, 1949). 
18 For example, in India: “Far too many in the Indian judicial system are reacting and responding to public sentiment and 
pressure with an eye on television cameras rather with their eyes blindfolded like Lady Justice. Judicial populism has become 
a disease, an affliction that runs the risk of creating institutional paralysis” (Business Standard, 2013). 
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In Hungary these tendencies have also occurred over the past fifteen years, creating the 
preconditions for the emergence of judicial populism. The three cases I mentioned above 
indicate that populism is an existing judicial approach amongst Hungarian judges. Being aware 
of the fact that some populist judicial decisions can be delivered in almost every period and 
every legal system,19 the question is therefore why it might be worthwhile to examine Hungarian 
judicial practice from this perspective. 
Research has shown that this phenomenon in Hungary is part of a general tendency 
that can also be detected in some of the CEE countries. In these legal systems we are confronted 
with a greater intensity of populist judgments than in Western countries.20 
Over the past few years several surveys have revealed that Hungarian courts have 
adopted an explicitly majority-protective legal position in hate crimes cases (Jovánovics et al., 
2013; Bencze 2014), and Hungarian justice has more frequently found Romany people guilty 
in one of the hate crimes (violence against a member of a community) than non-Romany 
ones (Jovánovics, 2013). Paradoxically, the objective of the legislation, which introduced hate 
crime into the Penal Code, was to protect vulnerable minorities.21 In the field of sentencing a 
significant bias can also be detected, especially in murder cases. It seems that many judges tend 
to impose severe sentences on perpetrators coming from ethnic minorities. On the other hand, 
judges are usually more lenient when it comes to crimes committed against ethnic minorities 
(Ivány, 2012).
It is important to mention two facts here. On one hand, hate crimes committed against 
non-Romany people almost always receive nation-wide publicity; on the other hand, a survey 
conducted by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee referred to above did not find any difference 
in sentencing between Romany and non-Romany perpetrators in robbery cases which did not 
trigger a “threshold stimulus” for the national media. Taking into consideration that a pro-
majority mentality is one of the characteristics of populism in CEE countries (Smilov, 2010), 
these two facts seem to support the hypothesis that the populist approach and not racism is 
responsible for numerous judicial miscarriages in Hungary. 
Beside criminal cases, we can find the trace of judicial populism in other branches of 
adjudication, as well. If we scrutinize the published civil or administrative court verdicts from 
the past 15 years —with one exception— we cannot find cases where any fundamental rights 
would have overridden the right to religious freedom or religious sentiments in cases where one 
of the parties was the Catholic Church itself. It is an important feature of all these cases that the 
legal correctness of the judgements was highly controversial (Bencze et al., 2015). According to 
the results of the last two censuses, it is obvious that the majority of Hungarian society identifies 
itself as Roman Catholic. A plausible explanation of the legally arguable decisions therefore is 
the pro-majoritarian populism of the courts.
7. Judicial formalism and judicial populism
My analysis may surprise those who have studied the extensive literature of judicial styles in 
CEE countries. According to the predominant view, the problem with judiciaries in these 
countries is quite the opposite to my findings: judges generally follow a formalist adjudicative 
style that often leads to absurd decisions (Fogelkou, 2002; Kühn, 2004; Galligan et al., 2005; 
Schwartz, 2000; Falkner et al., 2008). 
19  For example, see IRA-related miscarriages of justice in the United Kingdom: The Guardian (2009). 
20 Smilov, after having examined the tendency of adjudication in Bulgaria and other orthodox Eastern European countries, 
comes to a similar conclusion (Smilov, 2010). 
21 The amendments can be found in: http://www.parlament.hu/iromany/fulltext/00548txt.htm  
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Why is the situation, at least partly, different in Hungary and some other CEE countries? First, 
we have to clarify the concept of judicial formalism. Formalism is often characterized as the 
“most-locally-applicable-rule” approach in legal decision-making (Schauer, 1991). This means 
that the practitioner tries to solve a given legal problem by relying exclusively on the text of 
the law, accepted legal doctrines and the traditional interpretive methods, without taking into 
consideration the wider social and legal context of the case. This model represents a judicial 
attitude to remaining loyal to traditional legal reasons, as they serve the idea of the rule of law 
the best. This attitude often lies behind the above-mentioned formalist model of adjudication.
Although this description of formalism may explain a certain type of the possible 
judicial approaches to “easy” or “routine” cases satisfactorily, it is certainly misleading when it 
comes to “hard cases” in which the law is uncertain. It is obvious that in deciding a difficult case 
a judge cannot bind herself to the text of the rule, since the applicability of the “most locally 
rule” becomes itself questionable in such cases. In this situation judges necessarily have to seek 
a ground for resolving the legal problem in front of them other than finding traditional legal 
reasons. Nonetheless, it does make sense to speak about the formalistic adjudicative approach 
in cases where a judge has to deal with a difficult legal problem. If a judge does not depart from 
traditional legal arguments in providing reasons for the judgment even in difficult cases, we 
can also label her method formalistic. In this case the judge’s decision cannot be deduced from 
the traditional legal arguments that she presents in the opinion, even though she refers only to 
those arguments. 
On the basis of distinguishing between these two senses of the term under examination, 
one can see that on one hand, formalism is a certain judicial attitude (“most-locally-applicable-
rule” approach), and on the other, a kind of judicial strategy (the judge presenting the decision 
as a logical deduction from traditional legal arguments). One can also easily realize that strategic 
formalism can be used not only in genuine hard cases but in any other cases where the judge 
intends to diverge from the results that would otherwise be required from a trained judge. 
Under these circumstances formalism may function as a cover for the judge’s hidden agenda.
 Strategic formalism, which is quite widespread amongst Hungarian judges (Bencze, 
2011), therefore facilitates the emergence of judicial populism. Judgments driven by populism 
cannot be criticised on the basis of relying on illegitimate reasons, because the judgment, 
seemingly, is supported by appropriate legal arguments.22 This method, furthermore, prevents 
parties and the public audience from understanding the real considerations driving the judge 
in the decision-making process. Judicial populism therefore presupposes the strategic use of 
traditional legal arguments, because a judge —at least in the Continental legal cultures— 
cannot refer openly to public sentiment.23
22 The “King” of formalistic arguments is probably the often used reference to the “court’s own legal standpoint” — without 
any further clarification (Bencze, 2011). 
23 Logically, the next step would be to explore the circumstances which could cause the emergence of strategic formalism. 
Such an examination would lead far from the original subject of this paper. Nonetheless, two factors can be mentioned here: 
1) the lack of any institutionalized quality-control mechanism against judicial reasoning (for example, we can hardly detect 
any real impact of scholarly criticism on Hungarian adjudication); 2) in Hungary the quality of statutory drafts counts as 
a serious problem. Drafters have the tendency to formulate ‘the Legislator’s Will’ in vague and uncertain terms (using the 
language of abstract declarations) which makes the adjudication unpredictable and somehow uncontrollable. This has led 
directly to the use of the oversimplified, “one-size-fits-all” type of argument which is spreading among judges and makes it 
easier to provide legally flawed populist decisions with token reasoning (Bencze, 2018). 
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8. The Hungarian flavour of judicial populism 
Apart from the above-mentioned general tendency towards the mediatisation and politicisation 
of adjudication, some factors can also be identified that have a strengthening effect on the 
spreading of judicial populism in Hungary. 
First of all, we must mention that political populism in Hungary has become 
stronger over the last few years. There are many unambiguous examples of the application 
of this political strategy. Criminal legislation in the past 10 years has followed a “classic” 
populist agenda (Gönczöl, 2013; Tóth, 2012; Fleck, 2014). One of the first moves the new 
government took in 2010 was to enact the notorious “three strikes” provision in the Penal 
Code.24 A parliamentary majority then implemented an American style “lawful defense” 
making legal the murder of a trespasser under certain circumstances.25 Following this, the 
Hungarian government declared it would uphold the literal “life” imprisonment against the 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights which holds that it is an inhuman and 
degrading punishment.26 Recently, Hungarian legislation has criminalized some forms of 
help for asylum seekers and homelessness. 27
This may generate a similar attitude on the part of the judiciary (those who have an 
inclination to be popular), implying that a good judge serves the people rather than being a 
black-letter lawyer. As the reigning political party is doing the same thing in the field of politics 
and legislation (e.g. “getting tough on crime”) many judges may feel her populism justified. 
They may think that they can only win if they follow governmental strategy. 
In some cases, courts have had to deal with manifest political pressure when making 
certain decisions (as we could see all the three cases discussed above).28 Under such pressure 
many judges may sacrifice their professional conviction and independence for swifter progress 
in their personal career.
Secondly, the value-system of Hungarian society is (according to WVS 5th wave, 
[Keller, 2009])29 probably closer to the value-system of the Orthodox-Christian Eastern 
European countries than to other non-orthodox post-socialist nations. This indicates a relatively 
closed-minded society with a higher level of intolerance, the devaluation of human rights and 
liberty, the weakness of civil society and a general distrust of institutions. That is why populist 
judicial acts that typically hit vulnerable groups and individuals are welcomed by the majority 
of society. This can be the reason why judicial populism has become a serious threat to the rule 
of law in Hungary while it has only remained an isolated phenomenon in the Czech Republic 
and Poland (Smilov, 2010; Vig, 2014).
24 Art. 4, Act LVII of 2010
25 Art. 22, Act C of 2012
26  The Case of László Magyar v. Hungary. For governmental reaction, see http://nol.hu/belfold/trocsanyi-marad-a-tenyleges-
eletfogytiglan-1466965
27 The Guardian (2018) and Palfi and Tidey (2018). 
28 We can also find another case of open governmental pressure on courts. Following a judgement of one of the Regional 
Court of Appeals in which the court reduced the length of time of imprisonment of three Romany defendants who were 
all involved in the murder of a very popular athlete, the Minister of Justice and Public Administration sent a letter to the 
President of Hungarian Supreme Court. In this letter, which he wrote before the final judgment of the Supreme Court, he 
expressed his worries regarding the over-lenient sentencing practice of the courts, http://m.cdn.blog.hu/at/ataszjelenti/file/
Dr.%20Dar%C3%A1k%20P%C3%A9ter%20%C3%BArnak%20lev%C3%A9l.pdf.
29 See also http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
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9. Evaluating judicial populism
One cannot say that populism is an inherently negative phenomenon that we should expel 
from all spheres of public life. I would characterize it as a very dangerous tool, even though we 
need to resort to it sometimes. Taking the case of politics, there are very important messages 
and complex long-run political enterprises that do not have any impact on the wider public 
sphere unless we massively simplify them. That is why I have gathered some arguments pro 
and contra judicial populism.
First, we all know that the established judicial practice needs external challenges 
from time to time in order to be able to renew itself. Adjudication has to reflect social needs, 
and the requirements of the “Zeitgeist” also have to be followed somehow (in the sense the 
US Supreme Court did in the famous Brown decision). On the other hand, the populist 
approach oversimplifies legal-doctrinal questions and makes the law primitive and incapable 
of responding to the needs of a complex society.  
Secondly, populism builds the image of the “Good court”, and in this way it generates 
public trust in the justice system. However, at the same time it violates the principles of the rule 
of law and equality. Thus it may have a detrimental effect on the justice system in the long run.
Thirdly, lay justice is an organic part of justice systems almost everywhere in the 
world. The populist approach may substitute the merely formal lay participation (which is 
the case in Hungary, [Badó et al., 2007]) by embedding lay attitudes in the mentalities of 
professional judges. Nonetheless, it is the first order duty of professional judges to enforce 
the internal values of the law, rather than ignore them. That is why we cannot find “pure” lay 
justice systems anywhere in the modern world.
Besides these reasons, there are two general objections against the populist judicial 
approach. First, popular wishes sometimes simply do not deserve to be fulfilled; the question 
of what qualifies as right or wrong in a moral sense cannot be answered by referring to the 
majority’s opinion (the moral-philosophical argument). Second, the “will of the people”, or 
the “sentiment of the public”, etc. are very confusing ideas. It is very difficult to obtain well-
grounded empirical data on them (the sociological argument).
In my opinion, these arguments show us that ordinary people may have their 
say in justice administration but not in a crude and direct manner. The legislator and 
professional judges should filter the ‘will of the people’. Actually, these institutions are 
designed to tackle this task.
10. Questions, instead of a conclusion
I must emphasize that judicial populism is not the prevailing attitude amongst Hungarian 
judges; it is an existing phenomenon, though, which should be taken seriously. The very 
category of populism might need some further refining. It is possible that the category of “social 
conformism” better describes the phenomenon examined. 
Explaining and understanding this phenomenon also requires further legal-
sociological research. The theoretical questions arising from the examination of judicial 
populism are as follows:
The first question is whether judicial populism is a precursor of an emerging 
authoritarian regime, given that a populist judiciary is no longer independent, and can easily be 
influenced by powerful political actors. 
Secondly, how can we reconcile the Internet-based and increasing democratization 
of the justice system and the need for a complex legal system in a heterogeneous society? The 
decline of expert authority is a threat to complex social systems such as the law.
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And thirdly, what kind of social sensitivity would be desirable from judges? How can we 
distinguish between legitimate social sensitivity and illegitimate deference to the mood of 
the populace? 
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